Polemarchos

On Justice

Socrates:

So then, of the justice, you mention,

is it to provide agreeably to companions,

and of enemies, injuries?

Polemarchos:

‘It appears so to me.’

Socrates:

And what of he who is just?

Concerning praxis,

in which action is he most capable of,

benefitting companions,

and damaging enemies?

Polemarchos:

‘It appears to me,

his concern is surely conflict,

and surely symmachy.’

Socrates:

And also,

for those not engaged in conflict,

a just man will not be of use?

Polemarchos:

‘This does not appear complete to me.’

Socrates:

So then,

justice is also of use in peace?

Polemarchos:

‘It is of use.’

Socrates:

So then,

of what concern is the acquisition and use,

of justice in peace?

What would you mention its use to be?

Polemarchos:

‘Concerning agreements, O Socrates.’

Socrates:

And by agreements,

you are mentioning acts of participation,

or something other?

Polemarchos:

‘Yes indeed, acts of participation.’

Socrates:

And as for which certain participation,

is the just one an abler participant,

than the cithara virtuoso?

Just as the cithara virtuoso is for vibrating musical notes.

Polemarchos:

‘For argent money,

for my part, this is apparent.’

Socrates:

Accordingly, in what way,

whenever there is the use of argent money or gold,

in participation,

will it necessitate one who is more just than all of the others?

Polemarchos:

‘Whenever, O Socrates,

we consent to deposit with one,

and for it to stay safe.’

Socrates:

You mention surely,

whenever there is not a thing,

that necessitates making use of self,

reserve it with others?

Polemarchos:

‘Of course, absolutely.’

Socrates:

So, whenever argent money is of no use,

then, upon this self,

justice is of use?

Polemarchos:

‘I presume so.’

Socrates:

And concerning absolutely all other things,

on the one hand,

justice is of no use for each thing when in use,

and on the other hand,

it is of use when they are not in use?

Polemarchos:

‘I presume so.’

Socrates:

Accordingly, O companion,

justice is absolutely not of consequence,

if of course, it is of use,

when concerning things of no use being attained.

But let us be sceptical about this.

Is the one who is formidable at protecting from malady,

also the one most formidably able to elude,

and to produce it within?

Polemarchos:

‘It appears so to me.’

Socrates:

So, of course,

the agathos self who protects the military encampment,

also purloins the intentions and other praxis,

from the adversary.

Polemarchos:

‘Of Course, absolutely.’

Socrates:

So, someone who is formidable at protecting something,

is also a formidable purloiner of that thing?

Polemarchos:

‘It appears so.’

Socrates:

If the just one is formidable at protecting argent money,

then he is also formidable at purloining it?

Polemarchos:

‘In any event, this is how the lógos signifies,’ he affirmed.

Socrates:

So then, it appears that,

the just one, has been revealed as a purloiner,

and I presume,

self to have apprehended this from the side of Homer.

For indeed,

concerning the maternal grandfather of Odysseus,

he has an affection for Autolycus,

and also asserts,

self excelled all persons at purloining and solemn promise.

So, it appears that,

subsequent to you,

subsequent to Homer,

and, subsequent to Simonides,

justice is the art of purloining,

with certain benefits for companions,

and for damage to enemies.

Is this not how you mentioned it?

Polemarchos:

‘By way of Zeus, no!’ he affirmed,

‘But, for my part,

I am now not cognisant of that I was elaborating.’

But, even now, it surely appears to me,

that justice,

on the one hand,

is to benefit companions,

and on the other hand,

is to damage enemies.’

Socrates:

So, you command that,

of the just we were mentioning,

the just is,

to produce agreeably to companions,

but injuriously to enemies,

we need to place in addition to these primary mentions,

and concerning this,

we now need to mention in this way,

on the one hand,

produce agreeably to a companion that exists as agathὸn,

on the other hand,

damage the enemy that exists injuriously?

Polemarchos:

‘This is absolutely so,’ said he,

‘to me, this appears to be properly mentioned.’

Socrates:

So then, said I,

is it just for a man to ever damage a human?

Polemarchos:

‘Of course,’ said he,

‘it is requisite, of course,

to damage the malevolent and enemies.’

to be continued...

Excerpts from:

Plato, On Polity A (The Republic, Book 1) 

New English Recensional Translation

Written in Lineated Prose

An Approach to Dionysos for the Anagogical

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