Pleasure (Part I)

Socrates: Philebus says that the good in all living beings is to feel pleasure and delight, and whatever else is enjoyable to them, and to harmonise with all things of this nature. But what I argue is that these things are not the best. Instead, to be wise, to be thoughtful, to remember, and whatever is related to them, correct opinions and true reasoning are indeed more desirable than pleasure to all beings universally, that is, to those who are capable of participating in selves. And to all beings who have that capacity, the actual partaking of selves is of the greatest advantage, not only to those beings who exist but also to those who are to exist. Do we not, O Philebus, you and I, individually lay down such powers of reason as these?

Philebus: Exactly for all, O Socrates.

Socrates: And will you, Protarchus, accept the powers of reason as have been handed to you?

Protarchus: Out of necessity, I must. Philebus, the champion of our side, is tired and gives way.

Socrates: Then, it is right and proper for us to discover, by all means possible, the truth about selves and not to give up until we have settled the argument.

Protarchus: This must be so.

Socrates: Come, let us agree to this too...

Protarchus: To what?

Socrates: According to our differences, each of us should argue about the state and what present affection the soul is capable of to procure a happy and well-being life for all people. Is it not our purpose to do so?

Protarchus: It certainly is.

Socrates: Well then, you say that it is enjoyment, but we must demonstrate that it is understanding and being mindful.

Protarchus: True

Socrates: But what if there should be another life that comes to light, more preferable to both of these and more closely related to pleasure?  In this case, should we not, both of us, be proven wrong and obliged to yield in preference to a life that gives us the stable possession of those things wherein we place human happiness?  However, at the same time, it must be agreed that a life of pleasure would be much more desirable than a life of knowledge and mindfulness.

Protarchus: Without any doubt.

Socrates: But if this other life appears to be more closely allied to knowledge and mindfulness, then in that case, knowledge and mindfulness would be found to have the advantage over pleasure, and pleasure must give way. Do you not agree with myself that these things are so? Or what do you say they are?

Protarchus: I must admit that to myself they appear to be as yourself represent them.

Socrates: But to Philebus, how do they seem? What say you, Philebus?

Philebus: To myself pleasure seems, and will always seem, to be superior, whatever it is compared with. And you, Protarchus, will be thoroughly convinced of it yourself.

Protarchus: After having handed the debate concerning the powers of reason to ourselves, you can no longer be the master of that which should be yielded to Socrates and that which should not.

Philebus: You are in the right. I have discharged self of duty here call upon the Goddess to witness it.

Protarchus: We, too, are witnesses of these words of yours and can testify to the words you have just spoken. But now to that examination, O Socrates, which follows what you and I have agreed. Whether Philebus will be willing to follow along, or however he may desire, let us proceed and try and reach a conclusion.

Socrates: By all means. Let us begin with the very Goddess, who, according to self, is spoken of as if she were Aphrodite but whose actual name is Pleasure.

Protarchus: Perfect

Socrates: The awe I have relating to the use of the proper names of the Gods is not like ordinary people; it is beyond the greatest of human dreads. Hence, with respect to Aphrodite, I will call her by whatever name is agreeable to the Goddess herself. But, as for Pleasure, I know its many forms. We should begin by considering and inquiring into the nature of Pleasure first. Indeed, we hear it called one single name as if it were one simple thing. However, it assumes various forms, even those that are most unlike one another. Behold! we say that the intemperate person has pleasure, and the temperate person also has pleasure when self is being temperate. We also say that pleasure is present when there is a lack of good sense and with a person who is full of unintelligent opinions and foolish hopes. Equally, that pleasure is present in a person who thinks wisely. Now, any person who argues these pleasures are of a similar kind would justly appear to be mindless.

Protarchus: The pleasures you talk about, O Socrates, are indeed produced by contrary causes, but in self, there is no contrariety. But how can the self-state of pleasure, of all states, itself not be the most similar to pleasure?

Socrates: In the same way as colour, my friend, in this respect, the self is no different from all colours. Surely, we all know that black, besides being different to white, is also directly its contrary. The same is true with figures, too; figures are most like figures because they are all of one kind. However, as to the parts of self, some are directly contrary to others, and between others, there happens to be a kind of infinite diversity. And many other things we shall discover to be of this nature. Believe not in the powers of reason where things most opposite are all of them one. I fear we shall find some pleasures quite opposite to other pleasures.

Protarchus: This may be so, but how will they affect our powers of reason?

Socrates: In that you call them dissimilar, as they truly are, by another name; for all pleasant things you call good. Now, all pleasant things are pleasant, and there is no dispute with the powers of reason. But most of selves are damaging, although you call all selves good,  and then at the same time, you agree to them being dissimilar in their natures when a person forces you by their powers of reason. What, then, is that same determinant in every pleasure that is damaging and equally in every pleasure that is most good, from which you call all pleasures by the name of good?

Protarchus: What, O Socrates, are you saying? After having argued that pleasure is good, do you imagine that any person will admit to your notion that only some pleasures are good but that other pleasures are damaging?

Socrates: However, you will acknowledge that selves are unlike one another, and some are even contrary to others?

Protarchus: By no means if they are pleasure.

Socrates: We have brought ourselves back again to the same powers of reason, O Protarchus. We say there is no difference between one pleasure and another; all pleasures are alike, and we must acknowledge that the similar examples we have produced in colours and figures seem to have had no effect on our minds. But, at the same time, we attempt to argue in the manner of the weakest of arguers and mere novices in the powers of reason.

Protarchus: What do you mean?

Socrates: I mean that if I imitate you and defend my argument in your own way, I should dare to argue that two things, the most unlike, are of all things the most like to each other, and I should say nothing more than what you say. So that we both appear to be more inexperienced than we ought to be, and the powers of reason would thus slip out of our hands and fly away lost. Let us resume, therefore, once more, and perhaps, by reviewing the same selves, we may induce an agreement with one another.

Plato, The Philebus

The 'state' in this text refers to a permanent affection, and the present 'affection' is transient.

When the soul is passive, she acquires regular practices that are hard to give up because she experiences repeated acts of a similar nature. Therefore, she becomes fixed in a particular state.

When the soul is active, she regularly rejuvenates. From external experiences and her inherent qualities, she is gradually moved for benefit.

Now think about the mind, and on the one hand, a seemingly infinite number of distractions, and on the other hand, its available powers of reason.

Where is true happiness to be found? Is there a third state of life that, when perfected, is the most beneficial?

For readers seeking to follow this part of Socrates' thought process regarding the greater good of the human being, the fragments should be read in the following order:

Pleasure I & II, 

Infinity & Bound I & II, 

Memory, 

Desire, 

Opinion I & II, 

Pleasure III.

Note from the editor of Classical Philosophy