Euthyphro (Part VIII)

Euthyphro: That which is loved by the gods is pious, but that which is not loved by them is impious.

Socrates: You have now answered, O Euthyphro, most beautifully and in such a manner as I wished you to answer. Whether true or not, I do not know as of yet.

Let us consider what we say:

That which is loved by the Gods and the person who is loved by the Gods are both pious, but that which is offensive to the Gods and the person who is offensive to the Gods are both impious.

The pious is not the same as the impious, but the exact opposite of it.

Euthyphro: It definitely is so.

Socrates:  But has it not, O Euthyphro, been said that there is sedition among the Gods and that they oppose and are enemies to each other?

Euthyphro: It has been said.

Socrates: Let us thus consider, excellent man, the specific matters through which discord gives rise to enmity and wrath.

If myself and yourself differed in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were greater, would this make us enemies, and should we be enraged with each other? Or should we go off and calculate these things ourselves and be quickly liberated from this disagreement?

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Hence, if we differed concerning the greater and the lesser, should we not, by applying ourselves to measuring, soon bring our disagreement to an end?

Euthyphro: We should.

Socrates: And I also believe that by weighing things, we should be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.

Euthyphro: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: Then on what matters do we disagree so irreconcilably that we become enemies and enraged with each other?

Perhaps you cannot readily inform me, but consider whether they are such as these:

The Just and the Unjust

The Beautiful and the Ordinary

Good and Bad

Are these not the things about which failing to agree, we become enemies, as happens with all of humankind?

Euthyphro: Yes Socrates, it is these things upon which we disagree.

Socrates: Do not the Gods, Euthyphro, if they disagree on anything, also dispute these very issues?

Euthyphro: Necessarily so.

Socrates: Therefore, according to your assertion, O generous Euthyphro, different Gods think different things to be Just and Unjust, Beautiful and Ordinary, Good and Bad. For they never would confront each other unless they disagreed about these very things?

Euthyphro: You are correct.

Socrates: Do the Gods then not love those things which they deem to be Beautiful, Good and Just, and hate the opposites of these?

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Socrates:  But with respect to these very matters, some of the Gods, as you say, consider them to be Just, while others see them as Unjust. When they disagree, they wage war with each other. Is it not so? 

Euthyphro: It is.

Socrates: Therefore, it appears as if the same things are both hated and loved by the Gods, making what the Gods find offensive also beloved.

Euthyphro: So it appears.

Socrates: Hence, for this reasoning, all the same things will be found to be both pious and impious.

Euthyphro: It seems so.

Socrates: You, O wonderful man, have not answered my question. I did not ask you to whom the same thing is both pious and impious.

Plato, The Euthyphro

Although Euthyphro has yet to answer Socrates' question, the dialogue has nonetheless revealed several key themes that run through Classical Philosophy. There has also been a reference to numbers, greater and lesser, and heavier and lighter. 

Remember, Socrates is trying to reach the answer to this:

'Teach me, therefore, what this very idea is so that I can see it and use it as a paradigm. Then, I may identify anything you or others do of this nature as pious and anything not of this nature as impious.'

Note from the editor of Classical Philosophy