Euthyphro (Part VI)

 

Socrates: By Zeus, inform me of that which you strenuously assert you clearly know. 


What kind of act do you declare piety to be, and also impiety, both in respect to murder and other things?


Is piety, not the same itself in every action?


Is not impiety, which is perfectly contrary to piety, itself similar to itself?


Does not every impious act share one common idea found at the core of impiety?


Euthyphro: Certainly, Socrates.


Socrates: Tell me, what you say is piety, and what you say is impiety?


Euthyphro: Piety is that which I am doing now, namely to prosecute him who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege or anything else of a similar nature, whether the offending person is a father, mother, or any other.


Not to prosecute such a one is impiety.


See Socrates, what great proof I am going to give you in law that it is right not to spare an impious man, whoever he may be.


Men are firmly persuaded that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and yet they acknowledge that he put his father in chains because his father unjustly swallowed his children. Similarly, Cronus, the father of Zeus castrated his own father.


Although the matters I am dealing with are akin to the gods, my family and others resent me for prosecuting my own father, who has acted unjustly. Thus, men claim things contrary to each other in what they say concerning the gods and concerning me.


Socrates: Is this the reason Euthyphro why I am being brought to court, because when anyone claims things concerning the nature of the gods, I struggle to accept them? Thus, they call me an offender.


Now, since these matters concerning the nature of the gods appear to you - who is well acquainted with such things - as they do to others, we should accept them as so.


For what else can we say to those who acknowledge that we know nothing about such things?


Tell me, by Zeus, who presides over friendship, do you think these things about the nature of the gods happened in reality?


Euthyphro: Yes, and things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, of which the many are ignorant.


Plato, The Euthyphro



At this point in the dialogue, we have ventured into the realm of mythology. We will refrain from explaining the affairs of the gods here, as it would place too much load on this delicate dialogue. At the time, the narrations of the gods were criticised by the many, who were unaware of their deeper meaning.


Euthyphro is interpreting the affairs of the gods literally, applying their examples to resolve his current issues. However, this was not their intended purpose.


For clarity, the stories of the gods, handed down to us from the ancients, are indeed filled with wonder.


Note from the editor of Classical Philosophy