Euthyphro (Part XI)

Socrates: Shall we not contemplate, Euthyphro, whether this is well-expressed? Or shall we abandon this contemplation and permit ourselves and others to accept it as true when discussing these matters? Or shall we reflect upon the things we say?

Euthyphro: Definitely contemplate, although I believe the things we have said are accurate.

Socrates: Perhaps, O good man, we shall know about these things more clearly if we contemplate the following:

Is something pious because it is pious and beloved by the Gods, or; 

Is it because something is beloved by the Gods that it is pious?

Euthyphro: I do not understand what you are saying, Socrates.

Socrates: I will endeavour to speak more clearly. We say:

Something may be carried, and that something carries;

Something may be led, and something that leads;

Something may be seen, and something that sees.

Does yourself understand that these things are different from each other and further understand the way they differ?

Euthyphro: Myself appears to understand this.

Socrates: Is that which is beloved a particular thing, and that which loves a different thing?

Euthyphro: Without a doubt.

Socrates: Tell me then, whether:

Something which is carried is carried because it is carried;

Something which is being led is led because it is being led;

Something which is seen is seen because it is being seen.

Or some other reason?

Euthyphro: For no other reason. Entirely so.

Socrates: Therefore:

Something is not seen because it is possible to see it;

rather,

It is possible to see it because it is seen.

Something is not led because it is possible to lead it;

rather,

It is possible to lead it because it is led.

Something is not carried because it is possible to carry it;

rather,

It is possible to carry it because it is carried.

Is then what I wish to say easily understood, Euthyphro? What I wish to say is this:

If something is being made, it is not being made because it can be made;

rather,

It can be made because it is in the process of being made.

If something suffers, it is not suffering because it is capable of suffering;

rather,

It is capable of suffering because it is already suffering.

Do you admit this to be so?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Is it not also so with that which is beloved?

If something is beloved, it is not beloved because it is capable of being beloved;

rather,

It is capable of being beloved because it is already beloved.

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Plato The Euthyphro

For readers who are new to Classical Philosophy, try not to overthink this elegant dialogue. Read it, reflect on it, and allow your thoughts to rest in the back of your mind.

Truth and ignorance are woven into the dialogue, and the reader must seek stability in their thoughts amidst the back-and-forth confusion.

Note from the editor of Classical Philosophy